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Central banks have increasingly focused on a  • 
systematic approach to monetary policy. Simple 
monetary policy rules help to facilitate the com-
munication of monetary policy to the public and 
enhance its predictability.
Monetary policy rules have become an integral  • 
part of central bank models and are often ﬁ  ne-
tuned to maximize economic welfare. However, 
uncertainty about the “true” model can seriously 
affect the performance of these rules and should 
therefore be accounted for when designing robust 
rules.
Simple policy rules can often provide a good  • 
approximation to fully optimal policy under perfect 
information and are typically more robust to 
uncertainty.
In ToTEM, an optimized simple rule that responds  • 
to a forecast of the price level is more robust to 
parameter uncertainty than a rule that responds 
to inﬂ  ation.
M
onetary policy is most effective when the 
central bank’s objectives, and the means of 
achieving those objectives, are well under-
stood and regarded as credible by the public. This 
requires that the central bank communicate clearly 
what it seeks to achieve, such as inﬂ  ation control over 
the medium term, and how its current and future 
actions can be expected to bring about the desired 
outcome(s). Since the collection and processing of 
information is costly for private agents, it is in the 
central bank’s own best interest to respond to eco-
nomic developments in a predictable fashion that is 
easy to communicate. Not only does this facilitate a 
better understanding of current policy actions, but it 
permits markets to better forecast the central bank’s 
future actions.
Beginning with the seminal work of Taylor (1993), 
academic researchers and central banks have 
increasingly focused on the beneﬁ  ts of a systematic 
approach to the design of monetary policy. Monetary 
policy rules, or reaction functions, have become an 
integral part of central bank models and are often 
ﬁ  ne-tuned to maximize economic welfare. However, 
such ﬁ  ne tuning is inherently risky when the central 
bank has an imperfect understanding of how the 
economy functions.
This article discusses recent research on the inﬂ  uence 
of various forms of economic uncertainty on the 
performance of different classes of monetary policy 
rules: from simple rules to fully optimal monetary 
policy under commitment. Building on the research 
discussed in the Summer 2002 issue of the Bank of 
Canada Review, we explain why uncertainty matters 
for policy-rule design and provide quantitative 
examples from the recent literature, which has 
increasingly focused on structural models that feature 
rational expectations. We also present results for 
several policy rules in ToTEM, the Bank of Canada’s 
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and Rennison 2006), including rules that respond to 
the price level, rather than to inﬂ  ation.
The article begins with a brief discussion of the 
theoretical arguments in favour of commitment to a 
policy rule and the role played by such rules in the 
design of real-world monetary policy. It then discuss 
the four major forms of uncertainty with which central 
banks must contend when formulating policy and how 
each type affects the performance of various rules. It 
concludes with a brief review of strategies for design-
ing so-called robust rules: i.e., rules that perform well 
across a broad range of economic models. 
What Is a Monetary Policy Rule?
For our purposes, a policy rule can be thought of as a 
mathematical equation that determines the appropri-
ate level for the central bank’s policy instrument as a 
function of one or more economic variables that 
describe the state of the economy.
1 Given that such 
rules are speciﬁ  ed in terms of the policy instrument, 
they are often called instrument rules. An essential 
feature of such a rule is that while the policy interest 
rate varies through time in response to economic 
developments, its response to a given shock or state 
of the economy does not. Therefore, adherence to a 
rule is synonymous with predictability, and thus 
private agents in the economy understand how policy 
will respond now and in the future. 
One might question why a central bank would adhere 
to a single rule, since doing so might constrain it in 
unfavourable ways. Even if the central banks’ object-
ives do not vary through time, it may wish to maintain 
a high level of discretion in how it responds to the 
economy. The simple answer is that no central bank 
literally sets policy based on a single rule. For various 
reasons beyond the scope of this article, central 
banks do exercise a certain degree of judgment or 
discretion when setting policy. But this does not 
render the discussion of policy rules academic. What 
matters is that monetary policy is predictable from the 
viewpoint of private agents, whose decisions are 
inﬂ  uenced by current and future policy actions. From 
this perspective, the central bank’s strict commitment 
1  This is a somewhat narrow deﬁ  nition. In the economics literature, a 
rule can either describe how the policy instrument reacts to the state 
of the economy, or it can prescribe a particular economic outcome, 
such as the achievement of the central bank’s inﬂ  ation target—
hence the label “targeting rules,” (Svensson 1999). In the latter case, 
the behaviour of the policy instrument can be inferred only in the 
context of a full model that links the policy instrument to the 
targeting variables included in the rule.
to a published rule can be seen as one extreme, 
whereas choosing policy at each point in time in a 
purely discretionary fashion can be seen as the 
opposite extreme. 
Adherence to a rule is synonymous 
with predictability, and thus private 
agents in the economy understand 
how policy will respond now and 
in the future.
Recent empirical research generally supports the idea 
that monetary policy in many industrialized countries 
does contain a large systematic component. For 
instance, much of the interest in the so-called Taylor 
rule (Taylor 1993) is based on the observation that it 
predicts the actual behaviour of the federal funds rate 
in the United States over the period 1987–92 reason-
ably accurately. Thus, while no central bank literally 
follows a rule, their actual behaviour may be well 
approximated by such a rule. This is likely due, at 
least in part, to the fact that modern central bank 
projection models feature policy rules and that these 
models are used to provide policy advice.
So why do central banks behave in a manner broadly 
consistent with adherence to a rule? One key beneﬁ  t 
is predictability. Monetary policy is most effective 
when households and ﬁ  rms understand both the 
objectives of monetary policy and how the central 
bank goes about achieving those objectives. By 
explicitly or implicitly committing to a certain pattern 
of behaviour, a central bank can inﬂ  uence private 
sector expectations of the future path of the policy 
rate, which, in turn, can help the central bank achieve 
its objectives. For instance, suppose a central bank 
has earned a reputation for responding aggressively 
to inﬂ  ation whenever it strays from the target. Then, 
when an unanticipated shock causes inﬂ  ation to 
deviate from the target, the deviation will be perceived 
as short lived. As a result, agents’ expectations of 
future inﬂ  ation will not respond to the shock, which, in 
turn, will dampen the current inﬂ  ation response. In this 
way, a credible commitment to respond aggressively 
to shocks that affect inﬂ  ation, combined with private 
sector expectations that factor in that commitment, 
can attenuate the required policy response.
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Since the general consensus among central bankers 
is that the long-run objective of monetary policy 
should be price stability, a natural starting point would 
be to design a rule that ensures long-run price 
stability. For example, the Bank of Canada aims to 
maintain the growth rate of the consumer price index 
(CPI) at the 2 per cent midpoint of a 1 to 3 per cent 
control range. According to the conventional view of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, inﬂ  a-
tion tends to decline when interest rates are high, 
other things being equal, and increase when interest 
rates are low. Therefore, an appropriate rule would 
stipulate that the Bank raise the target overnight 
interest rate
2 when current CPI inﬂ  ation exceeds 2 per 
cent and lower it when inﬂ  ation is below 2 per cent. 
Restricting one’s focus to the long-run objective of 
price stability represents an overly narrow view of the 
role of monetary policy. It is generally acknowledged 
that monetary policy can focus on, although not 
necessarily fully achieve, multiple short-run object-
ives. For instance, a central bank may care about 
stabilizing both inﬂ  ation around the target and real 
GDP around potential GDP. To the extent that certain 
shocks push inﬂ  ation and the output gap in opposite 
directions, a short-run trade-off exists, which will be 
reﬂ  ected by the inclusion of both inﬂ  ation and the 
output gap in the policy rule. 
Perhaps the best-known policy rule is the Taylor rule 
(Taylor 1993), which was estimated using U.S. data 
and is given by:
   (1)
where   is the U.S. federal funds rate,   is the rate 
of price inﬂ  ation, and   is the output gap, all in period 
. According to the Taylor rule, when inﬂ  ation equals 
2 per cent and output equals potential output, the 
federal funds rate should be set equal to 4 per cent—
400 basis points (bps). Moreover, that rate should be 
adjusted by 150 bps up or down for every 1-percent-
age-point difference between actual inﬂ  ation and the 
desired level of 2 per cent, and 50 bps for every 1-per-
cent difference between output and potential output. 
The Taylor rule’s greatest virtue may be its simplicity, 
2  The target for the overnight interest rate is the conventional policy 
instrument in Canada.
since the policy rate in a given period can be 
described in terms of just two economic variables.
3 
The Taylor rule is a special case of a broader class of 
so-called simple rules. There are important exten-
sions to this basic set-up that include (a) lagged 
interest rates as an additional argument in the rule, 
and (b) replacing current inﬂ  ation by a forecast of 
future inﬂ  ation. A lag of the interest rate was initially 
added because it resulted in a better ﬁ  t of the data 
(Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2000), and it suggests that, 
in response to a change in economic conditions, 
central banks adjust the policy rate gradually over 
several months, rather than all at once, as suggested 
by the Taylor rule. Woodford (1999) has argued that 
interest rate smoothing or inertia is actually consistent 
with optimal central bank behaviour when economic 
agents form their expectations in a forward-looking 
manner. As the relative weight on the lagged interest 
rate increases, the future value of the policy rate 
becomes easier to predict, since it is determined to a 
greater extent by the current rate.
Responding to a forecast of future, rather than current, 
inﬂ  ation is also consistent with optimal behaviour if 
monetary policy exerts its maximum effect on inﬂ  ation 
with a lag and if the central bank is good at forecast-
ing inﬂ  ation. The policy rule currently used in ToTEM 
includes a role for both the lagged policy interest rate 
and a forecast of future inﬂ  ation, and is described by 
the equation:
   (2)
where   is the target overnight interest rate in period 
,   is the long-run, neutral rate of interest,   is 
the period   expectation of inﬂ  ation in period  , 
and   is the output gap.  ,  , and   are ﬁ  xed 
parameters that determine the degree of interest rate 
smoothing and the sensitivity of the policy rate to 
deviations of inﬂ  ation from target and to the output 
gap, respectively.
4 Note that   determines the degree 
to which policy is forward looking and is referred to as 
the “feedback horizon.” 
The rules discussed so far summarize the behaviour 
of monetary policy in terms of just a few economic 
variables, such as expected inﬂ  ation and the output 
3  Potential output was proxied by a simple linear trend of log GDP in 
Taylor’s speciﬁ  cation, which is straightforward to calculate.
4  In the current version of ToTEM used for projections, the optimized 
parameter values are   
and   per cent.
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one period to the next is, therefore, straightforward. 
But this simplicity typically comes at the price of 
reduced performance in terms of economic stabiliza-
tion. To see why, consider ﬁ  rst that the forecast of 
inﬂ  ation depicted in equation (2) will depend on every 
variable in the economic model, and in a fully articu-
lated model, such as ToTEM, the number of economic 
variables can be considerable. Implicitly, the strength 
of the central bank’s response to each of these 
variables is governed by a single parameter:   in 
equation (2). 
But suppose that instead of forcing monetary policy 
to respond to forecast inﬂ  ation, we allocate a separate 
response parameter for each variable that inﬂ  uences 
future inﬂ  ation, including the exogenous shocks that 
hit the economy. Such a set-up describes the essen-
tial features of fully optimal monetary policy under 
commitment. Such a rule will better stabilize the econ-
omy if the central bank’s model is correct and if the 
data used in the model are well measured. But as we 
discuss in the next section, such a rule may perform 
quite poorly if one or both of these assumptions turns 
out to be false.
Types of Uncertainty Faced by 
Central Banks
In this section we discuss the four main types of 
economic uncertainty facing policy-makers and how 
each affects the performance of different policy rules.
Shock uncertainty
In practice, a monetary policy rule represents one 
equation in a central bank’s model of the economy. At 
a minimum, the model will also include equations 
governing the behaviour of the variables that enter the 
policy rule, such as inﬂ  ation and the output gap. 
Taken together, these equations form a self-contained 
system that can be simulated through time to gener-
ate a path for the policy interest rate that is consistent 
with the outlook for inﬂ  ation, and vice versa.
Economic models, however sophisticated, are by con-
struction simple caricatures of the true economy 
(Coletti and Murchison 2002). They are intended to 
capture those linkages between households, ﬁ  rms, 
governments, and the central bank believed to be 
the most important, on average. Nevertheless, the 
deliberate omission of many idiosyncratic factors 
means that models will make prediction errors, which 
are referred to as shocks, and the associated uncer-
tainty is referred to as shock uncertainty. To under-
stand the impact of shock uncertainty on the perform-
ance of a policy rule, it is helpful to understand how 
policy rules are parameterized.
Economic models, however 
sophisticated, are by construction 
simple caricatures of the 
true economy.
For central bank models, such as ToTEM, that are 
used to provide policy advice, the parameters of the 
policy rule are normally chosen to minimize an 
assumed loss function,
5 which in ToTEM includes the 
variance of CPI inﬂ  ation relative to the 2 per cent 
inﬂ  ation-control target, the variance of the economy-
wide output gap, and the variance of the change in 
the target overnight interest rate.
6 The variances of 
these endogenous variables will depend on the 
structure and calibration of the economic model, the 
policy rule, and the variances and covariances of the 
shocks included in the model, which are normally esti-
mated using historical data. Choosing optimal param-
eters for the rule involves using the covariance matrix 
of shocks, in conjunction with the model, to compute 
variances for the endogenous variables that appear in 
the loss function. The task then is to choose param-
eter values in the policy rule that minimize the 
expected loss. 
In general, the optimal parameter values in the rule will 
depend importantly on which shocks were most 
important over history, as well as on the covariances 
among shocks.
7 This is because simple rules must 
trade off performance for simplicity. As a very simple 
example, consider an economy with just two shocks: 
a demand shock that pushes output and inﬂ  ation in 
the same direction, and a supply shock that moves 
them in opposite directions. Also assume that while 
the central bank seeks to stabilize output and inﬂ  a-
tion, the policy interest rate responds only to inﬂ  ation. 
In this set-up, the optimal response to a demand 
shock will be larger than the optimal response to a 
supply shock, since the policy response to a supply 
shock pushes output away from potential output. 
Therefore, the optimal response to inﬂ  ation in the 
5  Details of the loss function and of the optimized rule currently used in 
ToTEM are described in Cayen, Corbett, and Perrier (2006) and 
Murchison and Rennison( 2006).
6  The respective weights in the loss function are 1, 1, and 0.5.
7  Cayen, Corbett, and Perrier (2006) provide examples using ToTEM.
30
MONETARY POLICY RULES IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SPRING 2010policy rule will depend on the relative importance of 
demand versus supply shocks in the economy.
This simple example illustrates that the performance 
of optimal simple rules will depend on the nature of 
the shocks that hit the economy. If the relative import-
ance of various shocks changes through time, the 
performance of a simple rule will no longer be optimal. 
In contrast, since a fully optimal rule responds opti-
mally to each shock, the parameter values of the rule 
do not depend on the relative importance of the 
various shocks.
8 Relative to other sources of uncer-
tainty discussed in this article, shock uncertainty is 
unique in that it renders simple rules less robust than 
optimal rules.
Data and measurement uncertainty
Much of the data used in economic models, with the 
notable exceptions of the CPI and the labour force 
survey in Canada, is subject to periodic revision. As a 
general rule, recently released data are subject to 
larger revisions than data that have already been 
revised several times. When formulating policy, central 
banks must therefore be aware that the data on which 
they rely to gauge the current state of the economy 
contain a potentially important noise component. 
In addition to errors associated with data collected by 
statistical agencies, central banks must often con-
struct data for variables that are not directly measur-
able. An important example is the trend level of labour 
productivity. While measures of actual labour produc-
tivity are available from Statistics Canada, the under-
lying trend or permanent component must be esti-
mated, and this is typically done using a statistical 
ﬁ  lter.
9 Since these ﬁ  lters are often two-sided (i.e., the 
estimate of the trend in a given period is based on 
both past and future observations of the data being 
ﬁ  ltered), their accuracy declines as they approach the 
end of the sample, since there are fewer future 
observations on which to condition the estimate. 
In designing an optimal monetary policy rule, a central 
bank would typically respond more cautiously to a 
variable measured with error. To see why, we refer 
back to the example in which the estimated level of 
trend labour productivity is a noisy measure of the 
true level. Since potential output is constructed using 
trend labour productivity, the output gap will inherit 
8  For this reason, optimal policy under commitment is said to be 
certainty equivalent.
9  Butler (1996) provides a detailed discussion of the estimations of 
trend labour productivity and trend labour input that are used in the 
Bank of Canada’s conventional measure of potential output.
much of this noise. Now, consider a central bank that 
uses a policy rule of the form given by equation (1), 
which can now be written in terms of the true output 
gap and the noise component,  , as
  . (3)
Equation (3) reveals the nature of the information 
problem. By choosing to respond positively to the 
output gap (the variable measured with error), the 
policy-maker inadvertently reacts to the noise. This 
introduces undesirable movements in the interest rate, 
which feed back to the economy and generate 
unnecessary ﬂ  uctuations in output and inﬂ  ation. 
Cateau, Desgagnés, and Murchison (forthcoming) 
illustrate this point using an inﬂ  ation-targeting rule in 
ToTEM. The results are presented in Table 1.
The top panel of Table 1 shows an optimized inﬂ  ation-
targeting rule under the assumption that the output 
gap in ToTEM is perfectly measured; the middle panel 
evaluates the performance of that rule when the 
output gap is, in fact, not perfectly measured.
10 
Ignoring the measurement errors in the output gap 
leads to additional volatility in inﬂ  ation, the output gap, 
and the change in the interest rate, culminating in a 
12 per cent deterioration in the rule’s performance. 
Of course, a policy-maker who recognizes that the 
information at his disposal is not accurate need not 
naively follow a rule that is efﬁ  cient only in the 
absence of data uncertainty. Indeed, as is clear from 
equation (3), by choosing to respond less aggressively 
10  Cateau, Desgagnés, and Murchison (forthcoming) allow for data 
uncertainty by computing the discrepancies between the real-time 
and revised values of the Bank of Canada’s conventional estimate of 
potential output and modelling the resulting measurement errors as 
an AR(2) process.
Table 1:  Effects of data uncertainty
Loss
No data uncertainty
1.06 1.09 0.55 1
Data uncertainty ignored
1.31 1.10 0.56 +12%
Data uncertainty accounted for
1.04 1.25 0.51 +6%
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inﬂ  uence of the noise can be reduced. The bottom 
panel of Table 1 presents an optimized rule that 
accounts for the presence of measurement errors in 
the output gap. Owing to the difﬁ  culty of accurately 
measuring the output gap, the resulting rule gives it a 
lower weight
11 but places higher weights on inﬂ  ation 
and policy inertia. This leads to a more volatile output 
gap but allows better control of inﬂ  ation and of 
changes in the interest rate. Ultimately, the new rule 
reduces the inﬂ  uence of output gap mismeasurement 
relative to the baseline rule by half.
Parameter uncertainty
While economic theory can guide modellers on the 
nature of certain economic relationships, it rarely 
provides much guidance on the exact strength of the 
relationship. For instance, theory says that Canadian 
exports to the United States will strengthen, other 
things being equal, following a depreciation of the real 
Canada/U.S. exchange rate, since Canadian goods 
become more competitive. But the size of the export 
response is unknown. It must therefore be estimated 
using historical data and will be subject to sampling 
uncertainty, even if the underlying theory is correct. In 
this sense, policy-makers should regard the param-
eters of their model as random variables with some 
underlying distribution, rather than as known, ﬁ  xed 
quantities. 
Viewed from this perspective, it is natural to ask what 
differentiates parameter uncertainty from shock 
uncertainty, since shocks are also modelled as 
random variables. The crucial difference lies in the 
fact that a model’s parameters enter multiplicatively, 
meaning that they interact with the model’s endogen-
ous variables, whereas shocks are additive. Thus, 
while the optimal parameter values of a simple policy 
rule depend on the relative variances of the model’s 
shocks, the absolute variances are unimportant.
12 If 
we think about the model’s parameters as random 
variables, however, absolute variances do matter.
11  This result is in accordance with the literature. Smets (1999) shows 
that when measurement error in the output gap becomes very large, 
the efﬁ  cient Taylor rule parameter on the output gap falls towards 
zero. Orphanides (2003) shows that once the measurement errors 
between real-time and ex-post data are properly taken into account, 
optimized policy reactions are more cautious than otherwise. 
12  Slightly more technically, multiplying the covariance matrix of shocks 
by a scalar will not affect the optimal parameter values of a simple 
rule, since doing so will not affect the relative variances of the 
endogenous variables that enter the central bank’s loss function.
Consider the famous example given by Brainard 
(1967), in which inﬂ  ation is linearly related to the policy 
instrument, and there is an exogenous demand 
shock,  :
 
and the central bank’s objective is to minimize the 
variance of inﬂ  ation. The optimal policy rule with no 
parameter uncertainty sets the interest rate in each 
period to  , and inﬂ  ation is perfectly stabilized 
at zero each period. However, if the parameter relating 
the instrument to the target is not known with cer-
tainty, the central bank’s model will be characterized 
by:
 
where   is a random variable. There are now, in effect, 
two shocks in the model, and the multiplier on the 
second one is the nominal interest rate. If the central 
bank implements the same policy as discussed 
above, the variance of inﬂ  ation will be unnecessarily 
high. The optimal policy rule that accounts for param-
eter uncertainty in this example is  , 
where   is the variance of  . As the degree of 
parameter uncertainty increases, the optimal 
response coefﬁ  cient in the rule declines. This ﬁ  nding 
is called the “Brainard conservatism principle” 
(Blinder 1998). 
In addition to introducing uncertainty regarding the 
linkages between observed variables, such as inﬂ  a-
tion and the policy interest rate, parameter uncertainty 
also creates uncertainty about the correct level of 
unobserved, model-deﬁ  ned variables. For instance, in 
ToTEM, the real marginal cost of production in the 
consumption-goods sector is the key driver of core 
CPI inﬂ  ation (Murchison and Rennison 2006). Since 
Statistics Canada does not provide a measure of real 
marginal cost, it is calculated within ToTEM, and its 
properties reﬂ  ect both the structure and the param-
eterization of the model. As a result, parameter 
uncertainty introduces additional uncertainty about 
the future evolution of inﬂ  ation through its inﬂ  uence on 
marginal cost.
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to a forecast of inﬂ  ation (or of any other variable), the 
performance of that rule will be inﬂ  uenced by param-
eter uncertainty, since the forecast will not be as 
precise. Parameter uncertainty can thus be thought of 
as introducing noise into the inﬂ  ation forecast in a 
manner similar to measurement uncertainty (see 
equation 3), thereby rendering that variable less 
reliable as a guide for policy. In the end, whether it is 
better to respond to current inﬂ  ation or to a forecast 
of future inﬂ  ation, will depend on the beneﬁ  t of being 
forward looking, in the absence of parameter uncer-
tainty, relative to the cost of introducing additional 
noise in the policy rule.
13
Cateau, Desgagnés, and Murchison (forthcoming) 
derive optimized inﬂ  ation-forecast (IF) and price-level-
forecast (PLF) rules for ToTEM and compare their 
performance with fully optimal policy under commit-
ment (FO).
14 They then investigate the robustness of 
these rules to parameter uncertainty by analyzing how 
they would fare if the structural parameters that 
actually characterize the behaviour of private agents 
differed from those assumed by the policy-maker in 
13  The extent of the beneﬁ  t of setting policy in a forward-looking 
manner depends on the speed of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. All else being equal, the faster policy actions get 
transmitted to output and inﬂ  ation, the less need there is to be 
forward looking. 
14  The optimized inﬂ  ation-forecast rule for ToTEM is a rule that 
responds to current inﬂ  ation, the lagged interest rate, and the output 
gap. In contrast, the optimized price-level-forecast rule responds to 
the price-level forecast four quarters ahead, the lagged interest rate, 
and the output gap. The price-level-forecast rule is an example of a 
rule that implements price-level targeting, since this rule will 
eventually return the price level to the desired level following a 
shock. Optimal policy under full commitment is the policy that is 
optimally tuned to the model. It is, by design, a very complicated rule 
that depends on every variable that affects the state of the economy. 
Optimal policy does not, in general, fully reverse price-level 
movements following a shock in ToTEM and, therefore, is not fully 
consistent with a price-level-targeting regime.
deriving the optimized rules (Table 2). These types of 
comparisons are of particular interest in light of the 
Bank of Canada’s interest in evaluating the potential 
welfare gains of switching from its current inﬂ  ation-
targeting regime, to a price-level-targeting regime.
15 
Furthermore, most of the research to date that 
explores this issue ignores altogether the issue of 
uncertainty.
The top panel of Table 2 compares the performance 
of the optimized inﬂ  ation-forecast rule, price-level-
forecast rule, and optimal policy under full commit-
ment, using ToTEM’s baseline calibration. Without 
parameter uncertainty, fully optimal policy under 
commitment offers an 11.4 per cent improvement in 
performance over IF, while PLF would offer a 4.3 per 
cent improvement. 
The authors go on to investigate how parameter 
uncertainty affects these rankings by evaluating the 
performance of each benchmark rule in 5000 alterna-
tive parameter conﬁ  gurations drawn randomly from 
the Bayesian posterior distribution of the estimated 
parameters. The bottom panel of Table 2 contains two 
important messages. First as recently emphasized by 
Orphanides and Williams (2008), while fully optimal 
policy under commitment is the best policy if the 
parameters are known, it is often the least robust 
policy under uncertainty. Indeed, relative to the case 
of no uncertainty, its performance deteriorates 60 per-
centage points more than the other rules. Second, 
while IF is slightly more robust than PLF, on average, 
PLF still performs better than IF under parameter 
uncertainty. Therefore, while the reduction in loss 
associated with moving from inﬂ  ation targeting to 
15  See Bank of Canada (2006).
Table 2:  Robustness of optimized inﬂ  ation- and price-level-forecast rules
Benchmark rule IF PLF FO
No parameter uncertainty
Performance:   1- 4 . 3 % - 1 1 . 4 %
Parameter uncertainty
Robustness:   +80% +81% +142%
Overall average performance:   1- 3 . 4 % + 2 1 %
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tion is robust to parameter uncertainty.
16
Model uncertainty
So far, we have discussed uncertainty about the 
underlying shocks that drive business cycles, uncer-
tainty about the data used in a particular model, and 
uncertainty about the parameter values used in the 
model. But what about the economic model itself? A 
model may be misspeciﬁ  ed for various reasons: it 
may be built around an economic paradigm that is 
further from economic reality than assumed (Engert 
and Selody 1998); it may ignore economic relation-
ships that are, in fact, relevant; or it may be built under 
simplifying assumptions that make the model tract-
able (e.g., linearity) but less realistic. Since a model is 
ultimately only one view of how the economy works, a 
policy rule that is tuned to work well in a particular 
model may perform poorly across alternative but 
plausible views. 
Côté et al. (2002) analyze the performance of various 
simple rules in 12 models of the Canadian economy. 
They ﬁ  nd that simple outcome-based rules (rules 
where the policy instrument responds to current and 
lagged variables) are not particularly robust. In 
particular, they ﬁ  nd that rules with high degrees of 
inertia often induce substantial volatility in output and 
inﬂ  ation and are even unstable in many models. 
Since a model is ultimately only one 
view of how the economy works, a 
policy rule that is tuned to work well 
in a particular model may perform 
poorly across alternative but 
plausible views. 
More recently, Tetlow (2010) evaluates the perform-
ance of 8 alternative simple rules in 46 vintages of the 
Federal Reserve Board FRB/US model used by the 
Board’s staff for forecasting and policy analysis from 
July 1996 to October 2007. He concludes that model 
16  This is an important result, since ToTEM’s baseline calibration 
assumes a very small role for dynamic indexation to lagged price and 
wage inﬂ  ation. Thus, the distributions for these parameters are 
positively skewed, and nearly all of the risk is on the upside. In 
addition, research (see Ambler 2009 for a review) suggests that 
higher levels of dynamic indexation (or rule-of-thumb behaviour) will 
cause a deterioration in the relative performance of price-level-
forecast rules.
uncertainty is a substantial problem: model properties 
differ importantly according to vintage and so do the 
policy rules optimized by vintage. Further, while some 
rules offer satisfactory performance, many that are 
promoted as being robust to some speciﬁ  c type of 
uncertainty perform poorly when confronted with 
real-time model uncertainty.
Once we acknowledge that any particular model is 
potentially misspeciﬁ  ed, the results above indicate 
that model uncertainty can seriously affect the 
performance of policy rules in stabilizing the economy 
and, hence, should be taken into account when 
designing effective policy rules. In the next section, 
we review recent strategies for designing rules that 
are robust to speciﬁ  c forms of uncertainty, including 
model uncertainty. 
Robust Policy Rules
When designing policy rules, it is important to seek a 
robust rule—one that yields a satisfactory perform-
ance in an uncertain environment. There are two 
approaches to designing a robust rule. The ﬁ  rst 
involves deriving optimized coefﬁ  cients that formally 
account for speciﬁ  c uncertainties. That is, given a 
speciﬁ  c rule, we determine how strongly the policy 
instrument should respond to each variable in the 
rule, taking into account the features about which we 
are uncertain. The second approach involves deter-
mining a functional form for the rule (i.e., what vari-
ables the policy instrument responds to) that is less 
susceptible to yielding a poor performance, given 
speciﬁ  c uncertainties. These approaches are comple-
mentary and are often combined when pursuing a 
robust simple rule. In this section, we review how they 
have been or could be applied to design rules robust 
to each of the uncertainties discussed.
Robustness to data uncertainty
There are two main approaches for designing a rule 
robust to data uncertainty. The ﬁ  rst, alluded to earlier, 
involves formally taking into account that data are 
observed with noise and will subsequently be revised. 
A common strategy for dealing with this problem 
follows Orphanides (2003) in modelling the measure-
ment errors between real-time and ex-post data and 
incorporating these equations in the model prior to 
optimizing the rule. To the extent that future measure-
ment errors may behave like historical errors, this 
strategy helps the policy-maker design a rule that 
accounts for likely mismeasurement of the data. 
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not respond to variables measured with error. Taylor’s 
original rule was criticized by Orphanides et al. (2000) 
and by Orphanides and Williams (2002) for including 
unobservable variables, such as the natural rate of 
interest and potential output (or natural rate of 
unemployment). Given the difﬁ  culty of measuring 
these variables in real time, Orphanides and Williams 
(2002) propose difference rules in which the short-
term nominal interest rate is raised or lowered from its 
existing level in response to inﬂ  ation and to changes 
in economic activity (change in unemployment or 
growth rate of output). These rules do not require 
knowledge of the natural rates of interest or 
unemployment (or potential output) for setting policy 
and are consequently immune to mismeasurement. 
Orphanides et al. (2000) and Orphanides and Williams 
(2002) show that, in the presence of data uncertainty, 
these difference rules outperform rules that respond 
to levels of economic activity. But how do such 
difference rules perform in environments character-
ized by other forms of uncertainty?
Tetlow (2010) evaluates the performance of the 
difference rule proposed by Orphanides and Williams 
(2002) in 46 vintages of the Federal Reserve Board 
FRB/US model. The experiment provides an ideal 
laboratory for evaluating the robustness of a rule since 
it incorporates real-time model and parameter uncer-
tainty in a model used for policy-making. Tetlow 
observes that the difference rule does lead to robust 
performance in the sense that a difference rule 
optimized for a particular vintage maintains good 
stabilization properties across all other vintages.
Robustness to parameter uncertainty
The most popular approach for deriving a rule robust 
to parameter uncertainty is the Bayesian approach, 
which assumes that unknown parameters come from 
known distributions. That is, even though the precise 
values of parameters are not known, it is possible to 
determine the range of values that they can take, 
together with their associated probabilities. A robust 
rule is then derived by choosing the coefﬁ  cients of the 
rule to minimize the expected loss, given the distribu-
tion of parameters. Table 3 presents the results of 
Cateau, Desgagnés, and Murchison (forthcoming) 
who derive robust inﬂ  ation-forecast and price-level-
forecast rules for ToTEM under parameter uncer-
tainty.
17
The top panel of Table 3 displays the optimized 
inﬂ  ation-forecast (IF) and price-level-forecast rule 
(PLF) with the estimated parameters of ToTEM as 
benchmark. The bottom panel displays the robust 
versions of the IF and PLF rule under parameter 
uncertainty. The results suggest three important 
messages:
PLF is more robust than IF under parameter  1. 
uncertainty. The last column compares the overall 
performance of each rule under parameter uncer-
tainty. The robust PLF rule dominates the robust IF 
rule by 11 percentage points.
17  Cateau, Desgagnés, and Murchison (forthcoming) allow for 
parameter uncertainty by allowing a set of key parameters to take 
5000 possible values drawn randomly from the Bayesian posterior 
distribution of the estimated parameters. The robust inﬂ  ation-
forecast and price-level-forecast rules minimize expected loss; 
i.e., the weighted average of the losses across the draws. 
Table 3: Robust  inﬂ  ation- and price-level-forecast rules




IF 1 . 0 9 0 . 5 400 . 1 301 . 4 8 1 + 8 0 % + 8 0 %
PLF 0.99 0 0.07 0.17 4 1.84 -4.3% +81% +73%
Parameter uncertainty
IF 1.01 0.46 0 0.14 0 1.56 +1% +70% +72%
PLF 1.01 0 0.08 0.21 3 2.04 -4.1% +68% +61%
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leads to more aggressive policy responses. For 
instance, the robust PLF rule requires more 
aggressive responses to the lagged interest rate, 
forecast price level, and output gap. This translates 
into more aggressive policy responses as shown 
by an increase in the unconditional standard 
deviation in the interest rate,  , from 1.84 to 
2.04 per cent. The robust IF rule, on the other 
hand, requires weaker responses to the lagged 
interest rate and current inﬂ  ation but stronger 
responses to the output gap. The stronger 
response to the output gap dominates, making 
policy responses slightly more aggressive (the 
standard deviation of the interest rate increases 
from 1.48 to 1.56 per cent).
18
While Bayesian robust rules improve policy per- 3. 
formance under parameter uncertainty, they do not 
offer a signiﬁ  cant improvement. The second to last 
column assesses the robustness of the various 
rules by comparing their average performance 
under parameter uncertainty with their perform-
ance under no uncertainty. Although the robust IF 
and PLF rules improve performance over the 
benchmark IF and PLF rules by 10 and 13 percent-
age points, respectively, they still lead to a high 
average loss under uncertainty (respectively 70 per 
cent and 68 per cent higher than the loss that the 
benchmark IF rule leads to under no uncertainty). 
Note, however, that this increase in average loss 
may also reﬂ  ect that, on average, the alternative 
parameterizations of the model make inﬂ  ation and 
the output gap more difﬁ  cult to control, relative to 
the baseline calibration.
The third result illustrates a disadvantage of the 
Bayesian approach as a tool for deriving robust rules. 
By design, the Bayesian approach tunes the policy 
rule to work best across those parameter conﬁ  gura-
tions that are the most probable: i.e., receive the most 
probability weight. This yields a policy rule that works 
well in parameter conﬁ  gurations that are most likely to 
be true but whose performance suffers in the more 
extreme, but less likely, parameter conﬁ  gurations.
18  Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2010) also ﬁ  nd that parameter 
uncertainty leads to more aggressive policy in a micro-founded 
model. Uncertainty about the structural parameters in their model 
leads to uncertainty about the implicit “natural” rates of output and 
interest. They ﬁ  nd that optimal Taylor rules under parameter 
uncertainty respond less to the output gap and more to price inﬂ  ation 
than would be optimal without parameter uncertainty. But the more 
aggressive response to inﬂ  ation dominates, making policy more 
aggressive.
An alternative approach that offers more robustness 
to extreme parameter conﬁ  gurations is the worst-case 
approach. For example, Giannoni (2002) proposes a 
worst-case approach that does not require know-
ledge of the distribution of the unknown parameters. 
Instead the policy-maker knows only the bounds for 
each parameter and seeks robust policy rules that 
minimize loss in the worst-case parameterization 
within those bounds. Giannoni (2002) ﬁ  nds that a 
policy-maker that seeks to mitigate the effect of 
parameter uncertainty in a standard New Keynesian 
model would choose Taylor rules that respond more 
aggressively to both inﬂ  ation and the output gap. 
Both approaches are useful in determining robust 
versions of a particular choice of rule. Levin et al. 
(2006) use a micro-founded model to investigate what 
types of simple rules are effective when the central 
bank faces parameter uncertainty. They ﬁ  nd that the 
performance of optimal policy is closely matched by a 
simple operational rule that responds to the lagged 
interest rate and focuses solely on stabilizing nominal-
wage inﬂ  ation. Furthermore, this simple wage-stabiliz-
ation rule is robust to uncertainty about the structural 
parameters and to various assumptions regarding the 
nature and incidence of the innovations. However, the 
performance of the rule is sensitive to the speciﬁ  ca-
tion of wage contracts in the labour market. Indeed, 
when Taylor contracts rather than Calvo contracts are 
assumed, rules that respond to price inﬂ  ation and real 
economic variables perform better than the wage-
inﬂ  ation rule. Hence, the robustness of wage-inﬂ  ation 
rules hinges critically on structure and wage deter-
mination in labour markets.
Robustness to model uncertainty
There are two popular approaches to deriving robust 
rules under model uncertainty. The ﬁ  rst allows the 
policy-maker to consider different candidate models 
(e.g., those reﬂ  ecting different paradigms of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism) and seeks 
policy choices that perform well on average (Brock, 
Durlauf, and West 2007) or on a worst-case basis. 
Cateau (2007) proposes a decision-making framework 
where a policy-maker can consider various non-
nested models for choosing policy. His framework 
distinguishes between two types of risk: within-model 
risk (risk arising because of the stochastic nature of a 
particular model) and across-model risk (risk arising 
as a result of contemplating various models). He 
shows that the policy-maker’s aversion to across-
model risk determines the extent to which the policy-
maker wants to trade off good average performance 
36
MONETARY POLICY RULES IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SPRING 2010for robustness: as the degree of aversion to across-
model risk increases, the policy-maker wants to 
achieve more robustness at the expense of good 
average performance. Cateau shows that when the 
policy-maker wants to achieve more robustness, the 
policy-maker chooses less-aggressive Taylor rules 
that are in line with those estimated in the data.
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) compare the 
performance of various outcome-based and forecast-
based rules with the objective of identifying one rule 
that would perform well across ﬁ  ve distinct models of 
the U.S. economy. For their model set, they ﬁ  nd that a 
robust rule is a forecast-based rule that responds to a 
short-horizon forecast of inﬂ  ation (less than one year), 
the current output gap, and also involves a high 
degree of inertia.
The second approach derives policy choices that are 
robust to misspeciﬁ  cation of the policy-maker’s 
baseline model. In this approach, the policy-maker 
takes into account that his baseline model is only an 
approximation of some unknown true model and, 
hence, can potentially be misspeciﬁ  ed. In particular, 
the dynamics of the baseline model may omit import-
ant explanatory variables, as in Hansen and Sargent 
(2008), or parameters affecting the relationship 
between different variables may be unknown, as in 
Onatski and Stock (2002). The policy-maker deals 
with these misspeciﬁ  cations by choosing policy 
according to the worst-case model in a set of plaus-
ible models. Sargent (1999), Onatski and Stock (2002), 
and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) ﬁ  nd that 
robust rules are, in fact, more aggressive than those 
obtained when potential misspeciﬁ  cations are 
ignored.
Conclusion
Monetary policy is most effective when the central 
bank’s objectives, and the means of achieving those 
objectives, are well understood and regarded as 
credible by the public. This requires that the central 
bank communicate clearly what it seeks to achieve 
and, further, requires the central bank to respond to 
economic developments in a predictable and system-
atic fashion that is easy to communicate.
Since Taylor (1993), academic researchers and central 
banks have increasingly used simple rules as a guide 
to setting monetary policy. Simple rules have the 
advantage of being easier to communicate to the 
public than more complex policies and, by virtue of 
their simplicity, offer the promise of making monetary 
policy more easily understood and predictable. But 
what simple rule should a central bank use? The 
various uncertainties that central banks must contend 
with make the choice and design of a simple rule 
difﬁ  cult.
The results surveyed here suggest that uncertainty 
has a substantial impact on the performance of 
simple rules. Although simple rules perform better in 
an uncertain environment than more complex poli-
cies, their performance can still deteriorate substan-
tially. It is therefore critical to account for uncertainty 
in designing rules to ensure that their performance is 
satisfactory irrespective of the state of the world. 
Work with ToTEM suggests that a 
price-level-forecast rule is more 
robust to uncertainty than an 
inﬂ  ation-forecast rule. 
Our work with ToTEM suggests that a price-level-
forecast rule is more robust to uncertainty than an 
inﬂ  ation-forecast rule. While more research in this 
area is required, these results suggest that greater 
insulation from the effects of economic uncertainty 
may be an additional rationale for considering price-
level targeting over inﬂ  ation targeting. Finally, based 
on the literature, other rules shown to have good 
robustness properties, which also warrant further 
research, include a difference rule, where the change 
in the interest rate responds to output growth, as well 
as a wage-inﬂ  ation rule.
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